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CASE DIGEST

This CASE DIGEST provides brief analyses of cases that address current transnational legal issues. The Digest includes cases that set forth
new legal principles and cases that apply established legal principles to
new factual situations. The cases are grouped in topical categories and
references are given for further research.
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I.
MARITIME

ALIENS
UNITED

ADMIRALITY/SEARCH AND SEIZURE

DRUG

LAW ENFORCEMENT

ON FOREIGN VESSELS
STATES-FOURTH

ACT

IS APPLICABLE TO

OUTSIDE THE TERRITORY OF THE

AMENDMENT

HELD

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES ON THE HIGH SEAS,

INAPPLICABLE

TO

United States v. Davis,

905 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1990).
In 1987, a Coast Guard cutter spotted the defendant's sailing vessel
approximately thirty-five miles southwest of Point Reyes, California.
The defendant's vessel, the Myth of Ecurie, was approximately fiftyeight feet in length and was heading towards San Francisco. The Coast
Guard cutter's crew suspected that the Myth was transporting contraband because its name appeared on a list of vessels suspected of drug
smuggling. Furthermore, the Myth appeared to be carrying cargo and
was sailing in an area where sailing vessels seldom travel.
The Coast Guard requested permission to board the Myth. The defendant, howeve r, denied the request and stated that the Coast Guard
lacked authority to board his vessel because it was of British registry and
was on the high seas. The Coast Guard requested and obtained permission from Britain to board the vessel in accordance with a 1981 agree-
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ment between the United States and Britain. The boarding officer went
below deck and discovered over 7,000 pounds of marijuana.
Defendant Davis, who was not a United States citizen, was arrested
and the United States District Court for the Northern District of California found him guilty of violating the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1903(a), (j) (Supp. V 1988). Davis appealed,
and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the following questions: "1) whether Congress has constitutional authority to give extraterritorial effect to the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act; [and] if so,
2) whether the Constitution prohibits the United States from punishing
Davis' conduct in this instance; and, if not, 3) does the Maritime Drug
Law Enforcement Act apply to Davis' conduct?" Davis, 905 F.2d at
247-48.
The Ninth Circuit Held: Affirmed. The court held that Congress has
constitutional authority to grant extraterritorial effect to the Maritime
Drug Law Enforcement Act under the United States Constitution, article I, section 8, clause 10, which grants Congress the power to define and
punish maritime felonies. The court noted that there are two restrictions
on this legislative power: 1) Congress must clearly express its intent that
a statute has an extraterritorial effect; and 2) the application of the statute must not violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment. The
due process clause requires a nexus between the defendant and the
United States such that the application of the statute to the defendant
would be neither unfair nor arbitrary. The court noted that when a
criminal defendant's actions are aimed at causing criminal acts to occur
within the United States, sufficient basis exists for the United States to
exercise its jurisdiction. The court concluded that the defendant's smuggling attempt clearly fell within this standard.
Defendant Davis maintained that his vessel was not within United
States customs waters and that the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement
Act did not apply to its actions. The court, however, pursuant to 19
U.S.C. § 1401(j) (1982), noted that a foreign vessel is within "customs
waters" when the United States is enabled by a treaty or other arrangement with the foreign sovereign to board, search, and seize the vessel,
even if the seizure occurs on the "high seas." Verbal consent by a vessel's
flag state is enough to bring the vessel within "customs waters." Hence,
the court concluded that the 1981 agreement between Britain and the
United States and the verbal consent given by the British government
brought the vessel within "customs waters." The Coast Guard's search
and seizure was conducted pursuant to the agreement.
In addition, the court held that the search and seizure of the vessel did
not violate the fourth amendment. The Ninth Circuit cited the recent
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Supreme Court case of United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct.
1056, reh'g denied, 110 S. Ct. 1839 (1990), which held that the fourth
amendment does not apply to searches and seizures of nonresident aliens
in foreign countries, for the proposition that the fourth amendment provides no protection for noncitizens on the high seas. Significance-The
Ninth Circuit holds that Congress has constitutional authority to grant
extraterritorial effect to the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act and
that the fourth amendment does not apply to searches of noncitizens on
the high seas.

II.

ALIENS AND CITIZENSHIP

EXECUTIVE ORDER AUTHORIZING

NATURALIZATION

FOR ALIENS

SERVING IN DESIGNATED GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS DURING GRENADA
CAMPAIGN STRUCK DOWN-PRESIDENT REAGAN HELD TO HAVE Ex-

His AUTHORITY-SEVERABILITY OF ORDER IMPOSSIBLE AS
PRESIDENT DID NOT INTEND THAT ALL ALIENS SERVING IN UNITED
CEEDED

STATES FORCES AT TIME OF CAMPAIGN BECOME CITIZENS-Reyes

v.

United States Dep't of Immigration & Naturalization, No. 89-55403
(9th Cir. 1990).
Arthur Reyes was born in the Philippines in 1958 and has served in
the United States Navy from 1981 until the present. He soight to become a naturalized citizen of the United States, but his request was denied. Reyes subsequently sought naturalization pursuant to § 329 of the
Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1440(a) (1988) (Immigration Act) because he was in the military at the time of the Grenada
campaign.

The Immigration Act grants citizenship to alien members of the
armed forces who served honorably through periods of military hostilities, but applies only through executive order. After the Grenada campaign, President Reagan ordered that those aliens who actively served in
the campaign be granted citizenship under the Immigration Act. Reyes
had not served actively in Grenada and requested that the geographical
limitation be struck from Reagan's order. Reyes maintained that Reagan's executive power did not allow him to limit his order to those who
served in a particular geographic region.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of California agreed, but struck down the President's entire order rather than
striking only the geographic limitation. The Ninth Circuit Held: Affirmed. The court concluded that the Immigration Act does not allow the
President to limit an order granting citizenship to specific geographic
regions. By the same token, the court reasoned that it was extremely
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unlikely that the President would have signed the order without the geographic limitation. The court added that the legislative records of the
Immigration Act indicated that the President may apply the citizenship
provision of the Act only by designating the time periods to which it
applied (e.g., between September 1, 1939 through December 31, 1946
for World War II veterans). The court noted that the Immigration Act
had never been applied to a conflict that was shorter than five years.
Hence, the court found that the President could invoke the Immigration
Act's citizenship provision only by specifiying time periods within a prolonged conflict. Significance-The Ninth Circuit limits the President's
power to grant citizenship under the Immigration Act to aliens serving
in the United States military to occasions of prolonged conflict, and then
only when the President specifies time periods within the conflict.
III.
PROVISION
THAT

OF

RESTRICTS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

NORTHERN
LAND

MARIANAS

OWNERSHIP

ISLANDS

CONSTITUTION

TO PERSONS

OF NORTHERN

MARIANAS DESCENT HELD CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION

IN EQUAL PROTECTION

CHALLENGE,

Wabol v. Vil-

lacrusis, 908 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1990).
The Northern Marianas Islands (NMI), located in the Micronesian
area of the South Pacific, have been part of a United States Trust Territory since the end of World War II. See Willens & Seimer, The Constitution of the Northern Marianas Islands: Constitutional Principles
and Innovation in a Pacific Setting, 65 Geo. L.J. 1373 (1977) (lawyers
who helped draft the NMI Constitution describing the NMI land situation and the need for the restriction in land alienation). President Carter
approved the NMI Constitution in 1972, pursuant to the Trust Territory covenant between NMI and the United States.
Article XII of the NMI Constitution, which was reprinted as
amended in the notes following 48 U.S.C. § 168 (1982), provides that
the sale of a freehold or leasehold interest exceeding forty years, including renewal rights, to an individual not of NMI descent is void ab initio.
Plaintiffs, who were of NMI descent, brought an action in the NMI
Commonwealth Trial Court to void a lease agreement for a fifty year
term (including an option to renew) with defendants, who were not of
NMI descent. The defendants argued that the NMI Constitution's land
ownership restriction violated the equal protection clause of the United
States Constitution.
The United States District Court for the NMI upheld the NMI Constitution's land restriction, but redrew the lease on equitable grounds.
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The Appellate Division of the District Court reversed the equity ruling
and affirmed the NMI land restriction. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, after addressing jurisdictional issues, Held: Affirmed and remanded. The court concluded that the equal protection clause of the
United States Constitution did not apply to the NMI land restriction
and that the lease could not be reformed under the NMI constitution.
The court addressed the issue of "whether Congress could, under the
territories clause, properly exclude the particular provision of the United
States Constitution from operation in the Commonwealth. Put another
way, did Congress exceed its powers under Article IV, Section 3 by insulating [the NMI Constitution] from the reach of the equal protection
clause?" Wabol, 908 F.2d at 421. The court noted that it is well-established that the entire United States Constitution applies to a United
States Territory only if the Territory is incorporated (intended for statehood from the beginning); otherwise, only fundamental constitutional
rights apply. The court cited Northern Marinas Islands v. Atalig, 723
F.2d 682 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1244 (1984) (holding that the
sixth amendment right to jury trial does not apply in the Atalig as the
controlling precedent) and noted that the NMI clearly were not intended
for statehood from the beginning and that their status was unclear.
The court stated that land was scarce in the NMI and that the land
preserved NMI's cultural and political stability. The court concluded,
therefore, that the land ownership restriction was necessary to prevent
the NMI people from selling their land heritage for short-term economic
gain. The court added that the political union of the United States and
the NMI would not have taken place without the land ownership restriction. The court proclaimed that "[tihe Bill of Rights was not intended to interfere with the international obligations of the United States
...[or] operate as a genocide pact for diverse native cultures" and held
that the right to freely acquire land under the equal protection clause did
not apply in the NMI. Significance-The Ninth Circuit refused to extend fourteenth amendment equal protection to noncitizens in a United
States Trust Territory.
IV.

INTERNATIONAL TORT LIABILITY

REPUBLIC OF CHINA HELD LIABLE FOR WRONGFUL DEATH UNDER
ENTERPRISE THEORY OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR WHEN DIRECTOR OF
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE BUREAU ORDERED GANG LEADER TO MURDER HISTORIAN AND

GOVERNMENTAL

CRITIC,

Liu v. Republic of
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China, 892 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989).
The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency of the Republic of
China (Taiwan) was found guilty in a Taiwan court of paying gang
members US$20,000 to murder a Taiwanese man in the United States.
The court found that the director was motivated partly by nationalism
and partly by personal reasons in ordering the murder. The decedent's
widow sued for wrongful death in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California, but her claim was denied under the
Act of State Doctrine, and she appealed her case to the Ninth Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit Held: Reversed and remanded. The court stated
that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) holds foreign sovereigns liable for torts committed by its officials in the course of their official duties. The court explained that the tortfeasor must have committed
an act that would result in liability under the principle of respondeat
superior for the foreign sovereign to incur liability. The court noted that
the state law determines whether the official's action is within the scope
of respondeat superior, and held that the law of California would apply
since the murder occurred in California. The court articulated the California theory for respondeat superior as the "enterprise theory," under
which the employer's liability extends to "risks inherent in or created by
the enterprise" under a two-pronged test. Liu, 892 F.2d at 1427. An
employer is liable if: "1) the act was required or incident to the employee's duties or 2) the act was reasonably foreseeable to the employer."
Id. (emphasis original). If an employee acts for purely personal reasons,
the employer is not liable. The court concluded that finding that the
director was motivated partly by nationalism was enough to hold the
Republic of China liable for the director's act under California's respondent superior theory.
The court also considered the discretionary function exception to the
FSIA and found that because the Republic of China has a law prohibiting murder, the court was unable to exercise discretion in this area. The
court added that the Act of State Doctrine did not bar liability because
the act occurred within the United States borders and could "hardly affront the sovereignty of a foreign nation." Id. at 1433. Significance-The Ninth Circuit denied immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to a foreign official committing a tort in the United
States.

